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Wormwholes:A Commentary
on K. F. Schaffner's"Genes, Behavior,
and Developmental Emergentism"*
Scott F. Gilbertt
Swarthmore
Departmentof Biology,MartinBiologicalLaboratories,
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Erik M. Jorgensen
Departmentof Biology,Universityof Utah

Although Caenorhabditiselegans was chosen and modified to be an organism that
would facilitatea reductionistprogramfor neurogenetics,recentresearchhas provided
evidence for propertiesthat are emergentfrom the neurons. While neurogeneticadvances have been made using C elegans which may be useful in explaining human
neurobiology, there are severe limitations on C. elegans to explain any significanthuman behavior.

1. Introduction.The Bristol N2 strain of Caenorhabditiselegans is an
organism constructed for the genetic analysis of behavior. It has an
invariantcell lineage (the cell divisions which occur betweenthe fertilized egg and the adult are largely identical and always produce the
same set of tissues), an invariant nervous system whose 302 neurons
have reproduciblesynaptic connectivity, and an invariant genotype.
Moreover, this strain of C. elegans has a repertoireof behaviors that
it performson a very limited environment,a flat agar surfacesupplied
with a uniform pad of identical bacteria.The very richnessof life that
the Developmentalist Challenge claims engendersdiversityhave been
hunted down and eliminatedfrom C. elegans research.
*ReceivedOctober 1997.
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Ken Schaffnerhas now turnedto this organism-an organism"designed" to show that the basis for behavior lies in the genes-to ask
whether it supports the precepts of the Developmentalist Challenge.
The main issues of the debate can be distilled to the following five
questions:
1) Are discretebehaviorsdeterminedby single genes?
2) Is behavior an emergentproperty?
3) Will geneticanalysisin C. elegansrevealthe originof behavioral
variation?
4) How does knowledge gained from C. elegans bear on human
behavior?
5) Do genes regulate "higher' behaviors unique to animals like
humans?
2. Are DiscreteBehaviorsDeterminedby Single Genes?In the contextof
a wholeorganism,a singlegene can determinea behavior.In C. elegans,
the most compelling examples (and those discussed by Schaffner)are
the genes encoding the mechanosensoryreceptorsand the odorant receptors, for example, the odr-10 gene. This gene encodes the odorant
receptorfor diacetyl. In the absence of a functioning copy of the odr10 gene, the animal simply does not show movement (chemotaxis)to
diacetyl. Thus, in this sense, odr-10 determinesattraction to diacetyl
(Senguptaet al. 1996).
That genes affect behavior and in some sense determinebehavioris
obvious in humans, as well as in C. elegans. Childrenwith Angelman
syndrome generally have inappropriatelaughter, while childrenwith
Prader-WilliSyndrome have an insatiable appetite. Boys lacking the
gene for hypoxanthinephosphosphoribosyltransferasehave an uncontrollable urge towards self-mutilation,while those with William'sSyndrome tend to be gregariousand empathetic. As yet, we do not understand how the genes involved in these syndromes confer these
personalitytraits to the afflictedindividual.
Still these genes do not determinea behavior. The HPRT gene of
Lesch-Nyhan syndromeencodes a purine-salvageenzyme, not a compulsion. Genes do not act in a vacuum, and genetic analyses measure
the effect of the loss or gain of gene function in an intact organism,
that is, where all other genes are intact and functioning. Mice lacking
the HPRT gene do not share the human behavioralphenotype.Thus,
the geneticist determinesthe function of a gene by analyzing the difference between an intact individualand a second "identical"individual which only differs at this single locus. Thus, a gene may be an
essential component of any behavior, but it does not "determine"it.
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3. Is Behavioran EmergentPropertyof Many Genes?While odr-10may
encode a protein essentialin binding diacetyl,more complex behavior,
such as the actualmovementof the worm toward the sourceof diacetyl,
is diffuselyencoded. This movementrequiresthe productsof a myriad
of genes to constructand operatea motor circuit.(Here it is important
to identify the level of the behavior, and Schaffnersometimessuggests
that it is the worm's ability to detect diacetyl;at other times he suggests
it is the ability of the worm to move towards the source of this compound.)
One would have to conclude that behavioris an emergentproperty
from the levels of the gene or the neuron. Certainlythere is nothing in
the nature of the gene or of the neuron which could allow us to predict
the nature of behaviorthat arisesfrom it. We alreadyknow almost the
entire DNA sequence of the C. elegans genome, but the predictedbehavior of the animal does not emerge from this knowledge. We also
know the complete neural connectivityof the worm, but the behaviors
of the animalcannot be readfrom the patternsof neuronalconnections.
A behaviorsuch as chemotaxisoccursin a network or field in which
the interactionsof severalgenes and gene products are occuring.Thus
the knockingout of any one of them-the genesinvolvedin formingthe
odorant receptor,the genes encodingthe proteinsthat transmitthis signal to the cell body of specificneurons, the genes involved in allowing
other neurons to form synapses with particularmuscles, the genes involved in neuromuscularadhesion and muscularcontraction-would
preventthe behavior.To say that a particulargene "controls"a complex
behavioris akin to saying that a person scoredthe "winning"basketin
a 100-point basketball game (see Wheeler 1991, Gottlieb 1992). Similarly, to partition a behavior into its genetic and environmentalcomponents is akin to saying that the player scoring that goal was acting
independentlyof his or her teamatesand the opposing team.
4. Will Genetic Analysis in C. elegans Reveal the Origin of Behavioral
Variation?The behavioralbiologist cares about variabilityin a population, why certain individualsact differentlyfrom one another. Darwin's interest in inheritancefocused on these subtle variations in the
behaviors in a population. On the other hand, these subtle variations
in behavior are just the sort of thing that a good Mendeliangeneticist
abhors. The Darwinian concept of the gene was incrementalin nature;
many genes are thought to act in concert to produce a behavior. By
contrast, the Mendelian concept of the gene was discrete, each gene
regulatinga definedtrait and has an invariantrelationshipbetweenan
allele and phenotype. (Neither Darwin nor Mendel used the term
"gene," neverthelesseach had a concept of the unit of inheritance).In
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the creationof model organismsfor the study of genetics,thevariability
whichis so importantto the evolutionarybiologistis bredout. With this
standard reagent, the geneticist can look at genes in a "+" or "-",

or normal or abnormal, manner. To a geneticist, genes have discrete
outputs, they are digital in nature. This is largelyfor practicalreasons:
we cannot follow, map, and clone a gene unless there is a discretetrait
associated with its presence and absence. For this reason, screensfor
behavioral mutants preordain an outcome which indicates that each
gene regulates a discrete behavior. But this may be a fallacy of the
technique and not reflect reality. Moreover, when mutations emerge
with complex phenotypes (such as the inability to move towards any
compound), we tend to discardthem.
Thus, C. elegansresearchwill tend to indicatea discreterelationship
between genes and behavior.The behavioralbiologist cares about subtle variations that can be as diffuse as personality traits,just the sort
of thing that a geneticist abhors. For the behavioralbiologist, the behavior is the output of developmental history, the physical environment, one's status in a population, contingent personal history, and
the sum inheritanceof one's genotype. This is unsatisfyingto the reductionist behavioral geneticist because behavior becomes simply descriptiveof what is observed. It becomes a historical study. If a worm
had personality,a C. elegansbehavioralgeneticistwould most certainly
ignore it, and the reasons for this obstinancy are valid: the genetic
inputs into behavior have not yet been determined.We first need to
define the limitationson behaviorimposed by genetics.Then, perhaps,
future generationscan fix an input on the more difficultphenomenaof
environmentalvariabilityand chance.
5. How Does KnowledgeGainedfrom C. elegans Bear on Human Behavior?Work in C. eleganshas shown that genes can have very discrete
effects on simple behaviors. But the behaviors in which we are most
interested are complex human behaviors-consciousness, attention,
agency-and these we will never understandthese by studying C. elegans. With C elegans we have a hope of understandingthe relationships of genes to neurons, from neuron to circuit, from circuit to behavior. Certainly,principlesconcerningsimplebehaviorslearnedin C.
elegans will obtain in humans. We expect that the mechanismsunderlying even more complex behaviors such as learning or the emergent
propertiesof circuits will be shared in worms and humans. Although
the principlesdistilledfrom such studies will obtain in humans,it does
not follow that we will understandhuman behavior at the level that
concerns the philosopher. The dangerous assumption here is that the
behavior of C. elegans translatesto humans; but in fact many of the
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behaviorswe are exploringare no more complicatedthan the kneejerk
reflexin humanswhich only involves 3 neurons. Similarlyin C. elegans
most behaviors only encompass neurons at three levels: the sensory
neurons, interneurons,and motor neurons. C. elegans offers a bewildering richness of behavior with only 302 neurons, and the behaviors
of geneticallyidentical nematodes on an isotropic environmentare often different. One of us (E.J.) has mutants in which most worms lie
straightin a paralyzedmanner;but a fraction of them will consistently
take on a quite different"curly"posture. A "cloned"animal does not
breed true in relationshipto this posture but reproducesthe original
distribution of phenotypes. There is a stochastic influence. In organisms with the same inheritance,a small set of neurons with identical
connections, and the same environment,there are still behavioraldifferences as a result of chance events during development.What complexity does the human offer with 1012 neurons, some of them having
thousands of connectionswith other neurons?What complexityis then
added by having some neurons which respond to the rich abiotic, biotic, and social environmentsgiven to humans?
So what have we learnedfrom C. elegansthat will bear on humans?
We have learnedthat genetic differencescan affect behavior.The question is not "do genes control behavior"?Yes, they can. But rather,"to
what extent do genes control behavior?"In fact, in some sense, we
alreadyknow that genes can control consciousnessand freewill. There
are severalhuman mental retardationand behavioralsyndromes(such
as those mentioned earlier) wherein conscious behavior is altered by
the loss of individual genes. Does this explain consciousness or free
will? No. Or at least no better than atomic structureand quantum
physics explain the emergenceof life.
6. Do genes regulate"higher'behaviorsuniqueto animalslike humans?
If genes clearly affect behavior, what is all the fuss about? The issue
that upsets certainscientistsis raisedby the popularpress:do our genes
determineour behavior?Are we meaty marionettesjerkedabout by our
genes? We agree with Lewontin that it is very dangerous to ascribe
complex behaviors solely to genotype. A deterministicphilosophy is
dangerous for an organism with consciousness, agency, and different
environments. If homosexuality were genetic, then why aren't all
Greeks practicingbisexualstoday? If our genotype determinesour behavioral phenotype, how can there be people who undergo majorpersonality changes within their lifetime?
Another fallacy of these debates is the Nature vs. Nurture dichotomy. First, measuresof heritabilityare not fixed. Heritabilityis a measure of the degree a trait is inheritedin a certain environment.It need
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not even be a genetic parameter(Lewontin 1970, Block 1995). In C.
elegans research,we attempt to keep variations in the environmentto
a minimumand therebymaximizethe heritabilityof a trait.In humans,
a particularallele of a gene could be exposed to similar or radically
differentenvironmentsand the heritabilitywill vary as a consequence.
Second, the variance seen in such measures is often attributedto the
environment-specifically, the contribution that does not come from
inheritancemust come from the environment-but this is not necessarily so. Differencesin connectivitycould be caused by stochasticdevelopmental effects during development(see Schnabel 1997). The nervous system also seems to encourage such differencesby the "winner
takes all" mechanisms caused by Hebbian rules of neuronal connections. Thus, differencesin neural connections and their strengthsmay
emerge from developmental noise, respecificationby stimuli, and by
selectivemechanismsthat occur in development.
A third fallacy is that animal studies can reveal the entire human
behavioralrepertoire.Whilehumansare definitelyanimals,animalsare
not humans. Darwin noted the domestication of animals as evidence
that behavioral traits have a genetic basis, and breeders have noted
that single-geneinheritancecan accountfor differencesin the behaviors
of domesticated mammals. This is to be expected, since there is an
obvious endocrinecomponent to certainbehaviors.But humanbehaviors also have more complex levels. If you wish to curb aggressive
behaviorsin a bull, you can castratehim. If you wish to curbaggressive
behaviors in a man, threatof castration is often sufficient.And these
two mechanisms can act through different pathways (i.e., threat of
castration need not reduce testosterone levels, etc.). Moreover, there
will be variations in the responses to threats, and these responsesalso
are a component of behavior.
Between the gene and the behaviorthere are multiplelevels. Having
a gene does not mean that it is necessarilytranscribed,and transcribing
the gene does not necessarilymean that the mRNA will be processed
and translatedinto an activeprotein.If the proteinis activein a neuron,
it does not mean that it will contributeto the function of the neuron,
and if the neuron functions, it can act differentlyin differentnetworks.
Like certain genes that synthesizeenzymes in the liver or crystallinsin
the lens (the same protein having differentfunctions),the propertiesof
a gene product depend upon its context. The deletion of thefosB genes
from mice will change the nursing behavior of the mother (Brown et
al. 1996), but nursing is not the "function"of the transcriptionfactor
encoded by this gene. The idea that developmentis not a simpleconduit
but an interactivemaze that modulates what genes "do" has become
a major component of C. elegansneurobiology.
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7. So Why Do Genes Sell? Ken Schaffner has admirablycatalogued
eleven theses of this Developmental Critique, but on whose door
should he nail them?Two churcheson which to post the theses would
be those housing behavioral geneticists and journalists. These two
groups interact synergistically,each positively feeding back on the
other. The newspaperstrumpet that behavioral geneticistshave identified such things as the "gay gene," the "alcoholism gene," and the
"depressiongene." Afterwards,when other laboratoriescannot replicate these findingsand the scientificreportsare quietlywithdrawn,the
public is not told about the withdrawal(see Mann 1994, Nelkin and
Lindee 1995, Harris 1997). Our culturesubscribesto a molecularphrenology, and geneticcausation sells. Why do people "want"to hearthat
genes are responsiblefor behaviors?(The null hypothesisis to say that
this behavioris encoded into the genome, presumablyas an evolutionary adaptation;but we won't say that). On one level, geneticdeterminism becomes a useful way both to avoid responsibilityand to define
certain groups or individuals as being naturally bad (or good). On a
deeper level, genetic causation appears so compelling because that
many people believe that genes are the essence of our identity and
ethnicity.They have become our "soul" (Nelkin and Lindee 1995,Haraway 1997).
8. Summary.In summary,do genes control behavior?Yes. But can we
predictbehaviorfrom genes:no more than we can predictthe evolution
of mosquitos from understandingparticlephysics. But neither are we
faced with anarchy.Behavioris limited by genes. There is a behavioral
repertoireassociated with each organism. Schaffneris quite right that
C. elegansneurobiologistswill obtain the simplesolutions:"a necessary
condition," those elementsthat are the uniquelyrequiredcomponents,
but not the complete set. It is doubtful that we will understandthe
relative contribution of each gene to a specific behavior. By using
C. elegans,neurobiologistshave been able to documentthe complexity
that is inherent in a very simple neural system. And here may be the
place where the developmentalcritique of the simple reductionistapproach to behavior is receivingits best evidence.
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